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Amid the scholarly debate surrounding Newton’s natural philosophy, two seemingly elementary aspects of his theory of space have been, hitherto, seldom questioned: first, that Newton reckons space to be a form of independently existing substance or entity, a thesis often dubbed “substantivalism”; and second, that Newton’s view was deeply influenced by his seventeenth century neo-Platonic predecessors, especially Henry More, whose ontology ultimately grounds the existence of space upon an incorporeal being (i.e., God or World Spirit). A number of important investigations have begun to challenge even these ostensibly safe assumptions concerning Newton’s philosophy, however. Among these notable reappraisals is the work of Howard Stein (e.g., 1967, 2002) and Robert DiSalle (e.g., 2002, 2006), who conclude that the content and function of Newton’s concept of “absolute” space should be kept separate from the question of Newton’s commitment to substantivalism. Stein (2002) further contends, more controversially, that Newton does not sanction substantivalism apropos space. A related, albeit much more nuanced, interpretation that parts from the traditional substantivalist reading may also be evident in an influential early article by J. E. McGuire (1978a), who argues that space for Newton is “the general condition required for the existence of any individual substance . . . ” (1978a, 15).​[1]​ Turning to the second of our traditional assumptions regarding Newton’s spatial theory, Stein (2002, 269) rejects any significant neo-Platonic content; whereas McGuire had earlier conjectured that, though “Platonic in character”, the primary influence on Newton’s ontology is “Descartes’ Meditations, rather than the eclecticism of Renaissance Neo-Platonism, of which we find little evidence in De Gravitatione” (1983, 152).​[2]​
This essay will examine the ontology of Newton’s spatial theory in order to determine the adequacy of these non-substantivalist, anti-Platonist interpretations. While section 1 will introduce the main non-substantivalist strategies, sections 2, 3, and 4 will be devoted to a lengthy critical examination of the strongest form of non-substantivalist interpretation, in particular, the arguments offered in Stein (2002) that draw upon Newton’s early unpublished tract, De Gravitatione. As will be demonstrated, Newton’s spatial theory is not only deeply imbued in neo-Platonic speculation, contra the revisionist trend, but these neo-Platonic elements likewise compromise any strong non-substantivalist interpretation. Throughout our investigation, however, the specific details and subtleties of Newton’s particular brand of neo-Platonism will be contrasted with the ontologies of his contemporaries and predecessors, and by this means a more adequate grasp of the innovations and foreword-looking aspects of his theory of space can be obtained.

1. Two Non-Substantivalist Conceptions of Newton’s Absolute Space. 
Before launching into an investigation of the specific details of their arguments, it would be helpful at this point to delineate the general strategies employed by the principle proponents of a non-substantivalist interpretation.
The first claim is that, apart from his metaphysics, Newton’s concepts of absolute space and time in the Principia (1999, 408-415) are best regarded as definitions, or mathematical concepts or structures, required for the successful application of his physics, namely, for the three laws of motion and the theory of gravity (and including the mathematical apparatus associated these hypotheses). That is, Newton may have engaged in the sort of ontological speculation on the nature of space common among seventeenth century natural philosophers, but the really important aspect of his overall theory is the realization that “a spatio-temporal concept belongs in physics just in case it is defined by physical laws that explain how it is to be applied, and how the associated quantity is to be measured” (DiSalle 2002, 51). A thorough account of these definitional structures is beyond the scope of this essay, but they can be briefly discussed: Newton erred in positing absolute space (spatial position) and absolute velocity, but he was correct as regards absolute time and absolute acceleration (and, hence, rotation).​[3]​ We can label this strategy the “weak” non-substantivalist interpretation of Newton’s physics, for it allows other approaches to his natural philosophy that take into account the metaphysical disputes common in that era.​[4]​ The weak reading gains credibility in the first edition of the Principia (1687), which contains little, if any, metaphysics. “Substance” and “God” barely appear in the first edition of the Principia—yet, later editions of the Principia (the General Scholium of the second edition, 1713), the later Queries to The Opticks, and various non-published writings (to be discussed below) do indeed pick up these ontological themes, thus trying to infer whether Newton intended only a commitment to the weak thesis remains indeterminate at best. 
While the weak non-substantivalist interpretation will not be examined in depth in this essay, one of the most meticulous investigations of Newton’s concepts of space and motion, namely, Rynasiewicz (1995), would seem to be consistent with it. Stein 2002, on the other hand, apparently sanctions a much stronger position, namely, that Newton’s metaphysical deliberations do not, in fact, advocate a form of substantivalism—call this the “strong” non-substantivalist interpretation. Whereas the weak thesis is largely confined to Newton’s handling of the concepts of space, time, velocity, etc., as they appear in his physics, through stressing their constructive and foundational role in setting up his physics, the strong thesis actually engages Newton’s metaphysical writings in an attempt to counter the prevailing consensus that Newton endorsed substantivalism. Stein claims that “Newton’s ‘metaphysics of space’ is . . . that space is (some kind of) effect of the existence of anything, and therefore of the first-existing thing” (2002, 268). In essence, Stein interprets Newton’s metaphysics as sanctioning a conception of space that does not fit either substantivalism or its chief rival, relationism, which holds that space is merely the relations among physical existents—indeed, the view that Stein attributes to Newton is very much like Stein’s own metaphysical interpretation of space (spacetime), as a passage from an earlier essay makes clear: Stein claims that spacetime structures are “an ‘emanative effect’ of the existence of anything” (Stein 1977, 397), where the phrase in quotation marks, “emanative effect”, is an obvious allusion to Newton’s spatial hypotheses (as will be explained below). If space is conceived as an “effect of the existence of anything”, as Stein regards both Newton’s and his own theory, then it is quite difficult to pin an ontology to this thesis, let alone a commitment to substantivalism. That is, space is not an independently existing substance/entity because it depends (in some manner) on the existence of “anything”, presumably, physical bodies or fields, thus violating the independence clause for substances. But, neither is it a mere relation, since the domain (as the set of possible values) of the spatial relations in a given universe at any instant is not limited to the actual spatial relations among the material existents at that instant, as it is for under a strict relationism.​[5]​ In short, Stein’s non-ontological interpretation of Newton,​[6]​ like his own hypothesis of space, would seem to favor a “third-way” (tertium quid) between the prevailing substantivalist and relationist ontologies.​[7]​

2. Newton and Strong Non-Substantivalism: Making the Case.
Initially, the strong non-substantivalist analysis of Newton’s spatial concepts looks quite promising. In the unpublished tract, De Gravitatione, which most likely predates the Principia, Newton insists that space “has its own manner of existing which is proper to it and which fits neither substance nor accident [i.e., property]” (Newton 2004, 21). Space is not a substance because it cannot “act upon things, yet everyone tacitly understands this of substance” (21), nor is it an accident, “since we can clearly conceive extension existing without any subject, as when we imagine spaces outside the world or places empty of any body whatsoever, . . .” (22). The substance/accident doctrine holds that all existents come in one of two exclusive types: either self-dependent substances, or the properties that can only exist “within”, or “inhere in”, a substance (see, e.g., Bolton 1998, 179). In contrast, Newton consistently refers to space as an “affection” (affectio) or “attribute” (attributa), which may signify his attempt to employ neutral terms without substance/accident overtones​[8]​: 
Space is an affection of a being just as a being (Spatium est entis quatenus ens affectio). No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist. And hence it follows that space is an emanative effect (effectus emanativus) of the first existing being, for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited. (25)

Much of the ensuing investigation will attempt to unravel the complexities of this fairly enigmatic passage.
2.1. Space as a “Necessary Consequence or Result”. Based largely on the evidence in the above quote, Stein contends that “Newton does not derive his ‘Idea’ of space—its ontological status included—from his theology (as has often been claimed); for he tells us that if anything is posited, space is posited” (Stein 2002, 268). Since God is the first existing thing, “space (in some sense) ‘results from’ the existence of God” (268), but this does not detract from Newton’s general hypothesis that “space (in some sense) ‘results from’ the existence of anything” (268). He adds:
But this sense of the word—simply a necessary consequence, with no connotation of “causal efficacy” or “action”—exactly fits the rest of what Newton says; indeed, this meaning might have been inferred directly from Newton’s words: “[S]pace is an emanative effect of the first-existing being, for if I posit any being whatever I posit space”: the second clause tells us precisely what the first clause means. (269)

Stein’s attempt to attribute a strong non-substantivalist conception of space to Newton stands out rather clearly in this passage; for, stripped of its ontological connotations, “space as an emanative effect” becomes simply “space as a necessary consequence or result of the existence of anything”—and, of course, it is just this type of non-ontological notion of space that Stein’s theory counsels, i.e., space as a non-causally generated “fact”, with little or no ontological associations.​[9]​
How plausible are Stein’s arguments for the strong non-substantivalist thesis? While some of the objections will have to await the following sections, wherein the ontology of the Cambridge neo-Platonists will be discussed in greater detail, there are a few difficulties that can be raised directly. Above all, Newton never explicitly states that space is a necessary consequence or result, which is a description that, as noted above, seemingly equates space with a form of logical or conceptual fact, as opposed to an ontological, causal feature of existing beings.​[10]​ Presumably Newton would have emphasized this non-ontological notion of space in a more lucid manner, since his application of the relevant terms, especially “emanative effect”, often parallels the decidedly ontological meaning given to these very same terms in earlier neo-Platonist tomes.
Moreover, other passages would seem to support the traditional ontological picture of Newton’s spatial theory. After dismissing a substance/accident ontology, Newton nonetheless adds: “much less may [space] be said to be nothing, since it is something more than an accident, and approaches more nearly to the nature (naturam) of substance” (Newton 2004, 22). If Newton’s concept of space, as Stein contends, is not ontological, then one would not expect Newton to declare that space’s “nature” is closer to a substance than an accident. Put differently, if space is a non-ontological, necessary consequence of a being’s existence, it would seem to follow that Newton should reject any application of the substance/accident dichotomy to space—one would not expect, once more, that he would try to place the concept somewhere between these ontological positions.​[11]​
On the whole, the best evidence for Stein’s interpretation appears in the quotation examined at length above, where Newton claims that “space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited” (Newton 2004, 25; Et hinc sequitur quod spatium sit entis primario existentis effectus emanativus, quia posito quolibet ente ponitur spatium, Newton 1962, 103), whereupon Stein reasons that “the second clause tells us precisely what the first clause means” (Stein 2002, 269). Yet, in the De Gravitatione, the term “emanative effect” is not used with reference to “any being whatsoever”, but only to God or the “first existing being”. To avoid the obvious theistic implications, Stein takes the phrase, “first existing being”, to pertain to any first existing being, presumably even a mere corporeal being—but this interpretation strains credibility. On Newton’s theology, only God (or possibly a world soul) can qualify as the first existing being, as the context of the De Gravitatione makes clear. Once again, the evidence for Newton’s incorporeal ontological foundation for space will emerge in more detail in the ensuing sections, where the distinction between “emanation” and space as an attribute of “being qua being” will be explained, but a number of important criticisms can be mentioned straight away.   
First, if Newton’s concept of emanation is merely the claim that “if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited”, then one would expect a much more general application of the emanation concept to other beings, especially corporeal being. The fact that Newton never entertains the possibility that space could emanate from a material body, or anything else that is situated on the ontological chain of being below God (or a world soul) strongly suggests that Stein’s readings of “emanative effect” and “first existing being” are much too broad.​[12]​ 
Second, as regards Stein’s equating “first existing being” with “any first existing being”, a serious difficulty resides in the historical fact that there were clear precedents among the earlier Cambridge neo-Platonists for employing such phrases, like “first existing being”, with reference to God alone. In More’s Enchiridium Metaphysicum (1679), there are several notable instances of such terms in his well-known comparison of the metaphysical “titles” ascribed to both God and spatial extension: 
For this infinite and immobile extension will be seen to be not something merely real . . . but something divine after we shall have enumerated those divine names or titles which suit it exactly, . . . Of which kind are those which follow, which metaphysicians attribute to First Being. Such as one, simple, immobile, eternal, complete, independent, existing from itself, subsisting by itself, incorruptible, necessary, immense, uncreated, uncircumscribed, incomprehensible, omnipresent, incorporeal, permeating and encompassing everything, being by essence, being by Act, pure Act. (More 1995, 57)

As is evident given the references to “being by essence”, “being by Act”, etc., More’s discussion of First Being relies heavily on concepts that can be traced back to Aristotle’s Metaphysics; in particular, the existence of an eternal, immovable “first” substance required to ground the world’s lesser, finite, and mutable substances.​[13]​ These traits of First Being, therefore, are only applicable to God or a world soul, although More’s interesting point is that most also apply to space: “That which, however, is the first Being and receives all others, without doubt exists by itself, since nothing is prior to that which sustains itself” (59; emphasis added). Moreover, a similar use of language and concepts pervades More’s earlier works, such as the crucial section on emanative causation in The Immortality of the Soul (1659) that refers to God as “the First and primest Essence” (1997b, 35). Accordingly, the historical context of the terms and phrases in Newton’s work would seem to fatally undercut Stein’s reading.
2.2. Efficient Causation and Cambridge Neo-Platonism. As Stein admits (2002, 271), his interpretation runs counter to the prevailing consensus among Early Modern and Newtonian scholars, who have concluded, by and large, that Newton’s spatial ontology is thoroughly imbued with neo-Platonic natural philosophy: see the commentaries by Burtt (1952, 261), Jammer (1993, 110), Koyré (1965, 89), Funkenstein (1986, 96), Hall (2002), to name only a few. Edward Grant’s assessment is fairly representative of this position: “if space is God’s attribute, does that not imply it is somehow an accident or property of God” (1981, 243)? A notable exception to this line of reasoning, however, is presented in an influential early article by J. E. McGuire (1978a), which presents a view of Newton’s concept of space that can be interpreted, albeit only superficially, as similar to Stein’s assessment. McGuire initially sides with a less ontological, more factual or consequential interpretation, arguing that space for Newton is “the general condition required for the existence of any individual substance including its characteristics” (1978a, 15).
The relation between the existence of a being and that of space is not causal, but one of ontic dependence. Newton is defining one condition which must be satisfied so that any being can be said to exist. In short, the phrase, ‘when any being is posited, space is posited’ denotes an ontic relation between the existence of any kind of being and the condition of its existence. (1978a, 15)

Possibly prompted by John Carriero’s criticisms (1990), McGuire later qualified this account of Newton’s spatial theory, concluding that “the relation between divine being and the infinity of space “can be seen (in a curious sense) as a causal dependency, and, moreover, one that has a legacy in theological and philosophical thought” (1990, 105).​[14]​ It will be useful to explore these issues in somewhat greater depth, for they shed light on a likely source of Newton’s descriptive phrase “emanative effect”.
 McGuire contends that there is a medieval precedent for construing the relationship between God and space as “under the rubric of efficient causation”, yet, “since the notion of an eternal and efficient cause does not involve any activity, production, or active efficacy between it and its effect, it is difficult to distinguish natural or ontic dependence in these contexts from the notion of causal dependence between eternal things” (105). The difficulties concern how causation can link eternal “things”, namely, God, space, and time, which are not temporally prior to one another. The temporal symmetry between space and God does not undermine their manifest causal asymmetry, however, for space “depends” upon God’s existence in some causal fashion, but not the reverse (although God’s existence may be conditioned by space). McGuire offers the example of “Augustine’s foot eternally embedded in dust, and thus eternally causing its footprint” (105), as a characterization of this special form of efficient causation. As pointed out above, Newton’s influential older contemporary, Henry More, in his The Immortality of the Soul (1659), had employed the concept of an emanative cause in just this manner in explicating the extension of immaterial substance. More contends that there exists a spatially extended, immaterial “Secondary Substance” that is coextensive with the extension of material substance: he states that we have a “rationall apprehension of that part of a Spirit which we call the Secondary Substance. Whose Extension arising by graduall Emanation from the First and primest Essence [God] . . . ” (1997b, 35). More holds that “an Emanative Effect is coexistent with the very Substance of that which is said to be the Cause thereof”, and explains that this “Cause” is “the adequate and immediate Cause”, and that the “Effect” exists “so long as that Substance does exist” (1997b, 33). While there remain significant differences between McGuire’s and Carriero’s understanding of Newton’s use of emanation,​[15]​ they nonetheless concur that traditional ontological, and specifically causal, issues are at play; indeed, both agree that there are a number of Scholastic and, not surprisingly, neo-Platonic precedents for Newton’s handling of emanative causation as a unique type of efficient causation.​[16]​
Stein criticizes the allegation that a form of neo-Platonic causation underlies Newton’s spatial hypotheses, however. Commenting that “the grounds for thinking that Newton’s theory of emanation is neo-Platonic, or ‘Cambridge Platonic’, are very weak” (2002, 269), Stein asserts that emanation is distinct from creation for the neo-Platonists, and all being (except God) is created; thus space is not created, and thus (presumably) not a being. Yet, as just discussed, there is a Scholastic form of causation that does fit Newton’s use of emanation (which he obtained via More). It is true that Newton lists “uncreated” (increata) among the characteristics of space (33); but, as Carriero (1990, 113-115) explains, this use of “uncreated” is almost certainly due to the fact that, for Newton, the cause of a created being is prior in time, whereas an emanative cause is co-existent with (not temporally prior to) its effect. This interpretation of Newton’s use of creation is corroborated in the De Gravitatione when he declares that “extension is not created (creatura) but has existed eternally” (since extension is an emanative effect of an eternal being; 31). Equally important, Newton’s hypothesis closely follows More’s reasoning, since More both defines an emanative cause as co-existent with its effect, as well as lists “uncreated” among the attributes of space (see section 2.2).​[17]​ Finally, as Carriero also observes (114), while Newton states that space is uncreated, he never states that space is uncaused.
Consequently, despite Stein’s best effort to argue for a non-ontological version of Newton’s term “emanative effect”, the historical context renders such an interpretation extremely implausible. In short, since More also defines the spatial extension of incorporeal substance as an emanative effect, and given that More’s hypothesis stands as a clear instance of his neo-Platonic ontology, there can be little doubt as to the direct inspiration, and thus likely intended meaning, of Newton’s use of the identical phrase “emanative effect”.​[18]​
Besides emanation, a veritable host of sixteenth and seventeenth century natural philosophers proposed other hypotheses on the nature of space that closely parallel Newton’s, including many thinkers in England with whom he was directly acquainted (most importantly, in addition to More, Isaac Barrow and Joseph Raphson). For instance, the idea that space lies outside the Scholastic substance/accident categories was almost commonplace in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Fonseca, Amicus, Bruno, Telesio, Patrizi, and Gassendi, to name a few, all favored this notion, and, more significantly, theological concerns are heavily implicated in their respective views. These last two, Francesco Patrizi and Pierre Gassendi, in addition to More, probably comprised the main source of influence on Newton’s developing views of space, although their influence was likely obtained indirectly through More and Walter Charleton, Gassendi’s foremost English advocate. One can find a surprising number of close similarities between the individual hypotheses of these natural philosophers and Newton’s concept of space: for example, an atomistic or stoic cosmology, with a finite material world set within an infinite, three-dimensional void space, is common to all (except Patrizi, who fills empty space with light). Patrizi, like Newton, also emphasizes the mathematical aspect of space, which can receive all geometric shapes, and further argues that, while neither substance nor accident per se, space is nevertheless a type of substance not covered by the Scholastic categories; i.e., space is “closer” to the traditional concept of substance (Brickman 1943, 241). With Gassendi, Patrizi’s ideas would be developed in a direction that would prove highly attractive to the later Cambridge neo-Platonists. On Grant’s summation, “space”, for Gassendi, “is an absolutely immobile, homogenous, inactive (resistenceless), and even indifferent three-dimensional void that exists by itself whether or not bodies occupy all or part of it and whether or not minds perceive it” (Grant 1981, 210). More importantly for our analysis, Gassendi holds that space is both uncreated and co-eternal with God, although, like many Scholastic predecessors, he also believes that God is in every place while not actually extended (see section 4 below). The potential “impiety” involved in claiming some form of independent status for space would prove a source of concern for the Cambridge neo-Platonists, who nevertheless developed their respective spatial hypotheses roughly along Gassendian lines.​[19]​ It is against this historical backdrop that any assessment of the import of Newton’s concept of space must be examined, especially the relationship between God and space.

3. Neo-Platonism and “Determined Quantities of Extension”.
3.1. Is God Necessary for Newton’s Spatial Theory? For the advocate of the strong non-substantivalist thesis, a possible rejoinder to the evidence presented above would be to concede that ontological factors do play a major role in Newton’s spatial theory, but that these ontological factors need not be specifically theological in kind. That is, the strong non-substantivalist position might be compatible with a position that simply argues that God is not required for the existence of space, as allegedly evident in his claim that space is “an affection of every kind of being” (Newton 2004, 21).​[20]​ This form of argument may, in fact, lie at the center of Stein (2002); for, in defense of his approach, he insists that “on the objective or ontological side, . . . , Newton’s doctrine about space and time, in the light of his explicit statements, did not teach that space and time per se, or their attributes, depend upon the nature of God” (297).​[21]​ As regards the question, “Can we conceive space without God?” (271), Stein cites a passage from Newton’s critical assessment of Descartes’ hypothesis which equates spatial extension with matter:
If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to atheism, both because extension is not created but has existed eternally, and because we have an idea of it without any relation to God, and so [in some circumstances] it would be possible for us to conceive of extension while supposing God not to exist? (Newton 2004, 31)​[22]​

In commenting on this passage, Stein concludes that, for Newton, “extension does not require a subject in which it ‘inheres’, as a property; and it can be conceived as existent without presupposing any particular thing, God included” (2002, 271).
Yet, the problem with this rendering of Newton’s statement, put simply, is that Newton’s conceiving space without God does not necessarily entail that Newton believed that space can exist without God. Indeed, a significant part of Newton’s argument against Descartes’ ontology is precisely this point: that it allows a conception of spatial extension, as the essential property of corporeal substance, without any apparent connection to, or need of, the concept of God. In its place, Newton tentatively advances a neo-Platonic ontology in which both spatial extension and body depend upon God. 
3.2. The “Determined Quantities of Extension” Hypothesis. Newton’s contemplates a world wherein God directly endows spatial extension with bodily properties, such as impenetrability or color, without requiring an underlying corporeal substance to house these accidents: “If [God] should exercise this power, and cause some space projecting above the earth, like a mountain or any other body, to be impervious to bodies and thus stop or reflect light and all impinging things, it seems impossible that we should not consider this space really to be a body from the evidence of our senses . . .” (Newton 2004, 27-28). If we accept this hypothesis, then Newton contends that “we can define bodies as determined quantities of extension which omnipresent God endows with certain conditions (28); the “conditions” being, first, that these determined quantities are mobile, second, that they can bring about perceptions in minds, and three, that two or more cannot coincide. Through this process, these bundles of quantities can exactly replicate our everyday experience of material bodies without need of Descartes’ material substance, or the Scholastic notion of prime matter (27-31). These determined quantities, furthermore, are apparently sustained and moved through the exercise of the divine will alone, and Newton makes repeated references to the relationship between the human mind and human body, on the one hand, and God’s will and determined quantities, on the other, to make this point:
Since each man is conscious that he can move his body at will, . . . , the free power of moving bodies at will can by no means be denied God, whose faculty of thought is infinitely greater and more swift. And for the same reason it must be agreed that God, by the sole action of thinking and willing, can prevent a body from penetrating any space defined by certain limits. (27)

This passage hence foreshadows Newton’s later description of space as God’s “sensorium” (in the Queries to the Opticks, Newton 2004, 127-140), since the omnipresence of the divine will is directly analogous to the “omnipresence” of human thought and sensation throughout the human body—e.g., just as humans can move their limbs at will, God can likewise move bodily quantities through space at will. 
Therefore, with respect to the citation provided by Stein, Newton’s point is simply that any theory, like Descartes’, that links bodily extension to corporeal substance alone, such that mental properties are excluded, is apt to mistakenly infer that extended, corporeal substance can exist independently of God—Why?: because the divine will is erroneously presumed to be more akin to a mental property on the Cartesian scheme, such that it has little or no relationship with the extension of corporeal substance. Newton’s attempt to blur, or minimize, any sharp distinction between mind and body is, in fact, the method by which his “determined quantities of extension” hypothesis (hereafter, DQE) avoids the atheistic implications of both Descartes’ dualism of mental and material substance, as well as the Scholastic’s distinction between prime matter and substantial form. The passage cited by Stein (in section 3.1) is preceded by an explanation that clearly shows that Newton rejects any theory, like Descartes’, that ties body, and thus bodily extension, so exclusively to corporeal substance: “For we cannot posit bodies of this kind [i.e., on the DQE thesis] without at the same time positing that God exists, and has created bodies in empty space out of nothing . . .” (31). For the Cartesians and Scholastics, however:
They attribute no less reality in concept (though less in words) to this corporeal substance regarded as being without qualities and forms, than they do the substance of God, abstracted from his attributes. . . . And hence it is not surprising that atheists arise ascribing to corporeal substance that which solely belongs to the divine. Indeed, however we cast about we find almost no other reason for atheism than this notion of bodies having, as it were, a complete, absolute, and independent reality in themselves . . . . (32; emphasis added) 

Consequently, leaving aside issues of conceivability, the quote provided by Stein is not evidence that Newton actually accepts an ontology that allows extension, through its intimate connection with body, to be “as it were, a complete, absolute, and independent reality in themselves”—i.e., apart from God—rather, Newton argues at length that any theory that allows such an autonomous conception of bodily extension is in serious error!
Newton’s neo-Platonic credentials are in evidence throughout his assault on these Cartesian and Scholastic dualisms, moreover. Directly after the quote provided by Stein, he offers a number of further criticisms against strictly demarcating the incorporeal and the corporeal via Descartes’ distinction in substance:
Nor is the distinction between mind and body in [Descartes’] philosophy intelligible, unless at the same time we say that mind has no extension at all, . . . ; which seems the same as if we were to say that it does not exist, or at least renders its union with body thoroughly unintelligible and impossible. Moreover, if the distinction of substances between thinking and extended is legitimate and complete, God does not eminently contain extension within himself and therefore cannot create it; but God and extension would be two separate, complete, absolute substances, and in the same sense. But on the contrary if extension is eminently contained in God, or the highest thinking being, certainly the idea of extension will be contained within the idea of thinking, and hence the distinction between these ideas will not be such that both may fit the same created substance, that is, but that a body may think, and a thinking being be extended. (31)

One of the remarkable facets of Newton’s assessment is that it looks forward to the Empiricist’s skeptical analysis of substance,​[23]​ but, for our purposes, the important question pertains to the relationship between eminent containment and emanative causation, two separate, but similarly named, metaphysical hypotheses. While the evidence is rather sketchy, it is possible that Newton may regard the emanative causation of various accidents or attributes, such as extension, as an ontological consequence of their eminent containment in a higher incorporeal being.​[24]​ If Newton does accept this sort of metaphysical “entailment”, then his claim that “extension is eminently contained in God” (in the above passage), renders the strong non-substantivalist position quite problematic, including the version that only insists that space is not dependent on God.
3.3. The Question of Hierarchical Dependence. At this point, it would be beneficial to examine Newton’s concept of emanation as it pertains to the neo-Platonic ontological hierarchy or ranking of beings, i.e., the notion that all types of being (such as matter, humans, angels, etc.) fill positions within a hierarchical relationship of ontological dependence upon God. By this means, we may gain a better insight into his alleged Cambridge neo-Platonism, for the ontological hierarchy of being is a central feature of neo-Platonic thought. 
First of all, Newton strikes a decidedly neo-Platonic note by allowing for the possibility of a “world soul”, an immaterial being who governs the material world and who ranks just below God on the hierarchical chain. As disclosed in section 2.2, More embraces a similar notion, although Newton’s endorsement is both more hesitant and mentioned specifically in the context of his DQE hypothesis (to serve as the immaterial basis for the mobile, determined quantities): “some may perhaps prefer to posit a soul of the world created by God, upon which he imposes the law that definite spaces are endowed with corporeal properties, rather than to believe that this function is directly discharged by God” (Newton 2004, 30). On the whole, Newton’s De Gravitatione would seem to favor some limited conception of hierarchical dependence, at least among immaterial and material beings, for he states that mind may eminently contain body: 
That we are created in God’s image, holy writ testifies. And his image would shine more clearly in us if only he simulated in the faculties granted us the power of creation in the same degree as his other attributes; nor is it an objection that we ourselves are created beings and so a share of this attribute could not have been equally granted to us. For if for this reason the power of creating minds is not delineated in any faculty of created minds, nevertheless created minds (since it is the image of God) is of a far more noble nature than body, so that perhaps it may eminently contain [body] in itself. (30) 

There are several hints towards a neo-Platonist model of reality in this discussion, if only of a fairly weak and underdeveloped sort: e.g., minds are “images of God”, we “share in God’s attributes (to a lesser degree)”, and, mind may eminently contain matter because the former has a “more noble nature” than the latter. Yet, like More and many other Cambridge neo-Platonists, Newton’s De Gravitatione presents a material world that is, so to speak, spirit-infused—in fact, there appears to be a clear line of ontological descent, with God and his attributes, which includes extension, situated at the top of the hierarchy, moving lower to human minds (and other lesser spirits), and terminating at the level of matter. Regarding the possibility of a “world soul”, Newton adds a comments that strengthens this neo-Platonic reading: “the world should not be called the creature of that soul but of God alone, who creates it by constituting the soul of such a nature that the world necessarily emanates [from it]” (31). Throughout the De Gravitatione, Newton places incorporeal beings (spirits, souls) at the top of the hierarchy, with the lower, corporeal world regarded as emanations from these incorporeal beings. Finally, since these lesser beings have a share of God’s attributes, albeit to a lesser degree than God—and space is an attribute—it must be the case that these beings also share in God’s attribute of spatial extension. An ontology that includes space among the attributes that God emanates is thus also implicated in Newton’s hierarchy of immaterial and material being, a point that will be developed further in the next section.
3.4. The DQE Hypothesis and Strong Non-Substantivalism: An Assessment. In previous research of the De Gravitatione tract, careful attention has seldom been devoted to the aspects of the DQE hypothesis that specifically concern the nature of space. Part of the explanation for this oversight might be due to the explicit context in which the DQE hypothesis is first introduced, namely, as an account of the nature of body, and not—explicitly, at least—on the nature of space. Yet, if one desires to gain a better understanding of the ontological presuppositions of Newton’s overall spatial theory, then the DQE hypothesis is of crucial importance. In addition, although Newton states that his DQE hypothesis is “uncertain”, and that he is “reluctant to say positively what the nature of bodies is” (Newton 2004, 27), this should not divert attention away from the only hypothesis that he has, in fact, developed. Not only is a significant portion of the De Gravitatione allotted to the DQE hypothesis, but (as noted above) Newton makes repeated claims as to the superiority of this hypothesis in comparison with both the Cartesian and Scholastic alternatives: e.g., “the usefulness of the idea of body that I have described [the DQE hypothesis] is brought out by the fact that it clearly involves the principal truths of metaphysics and thoroughly confirms and explains them” (31). In summarizing the importance of this hypothesis, he adds: “So much for the nature of bodies, which in explicating I judge that I have sufficiently proved that such a creation as I have expounded [the DQE hypothesis] is most clearly the work of God, and if this world were not constituted from that creation, at least another very like it could be constituted” (33). Nevertheless, since the endorsement of the DQE hypothesis does remain tentative, it is possible that other attempts to construct a theory of material bodies, but which still uphold God’s central role, may have been amenable to Newton.
On the other hand, there is an interesting piece of indirect evidence that may support the contention that Newton not only accepted the DQE hypothesis, even granting his expressed hesitation, but did so until well into his later years. In a footnote to Pierre Coste’s French translation of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, third edition, Coste reports that Newton provided an account of the creation of matter, in 1710, that correlates with the DQE hypothesis in the De Gravitatione (Koyré 1965, 92). While this report falls short of conclusive proof, it should nevertheless assist in countering any effort to discredit or belittle the importance of the DQE hypothesis. Less specific, but also important, is David Gregory’s summary of his conversations with Newton in 1705: “He believes God to be omnipresent in the literal sense . . . for he supposes that as God is present in space where there is no body, he is present in space where a body is also present . . . (Hiscock 1937, 29).
In brief, what the DQE hypothesis reveals about Newton’s ontology is that the Western conception of God, or some spiritual entity at (or near) the hierarchical level of God, is the emanative cause of corporeal being, and perhaps eminently contains incorporeal being. All of Newton’s examples of emanative causation and eminent containment in the De Gravitatione, as revealed above, involve a mental/spiritual entity as the source—i.e., God, the world soul, created minds—and either matter or space as the emanative effect or the eminently contained entity.​[25]​ Thus, even apart from the question of God’s attribute of extension, since body is at (or near) the lowest rung in the hierarchy, and thereby depends for its existence on these incorporeal beings, space cannot be the emanative effect of matter/body. Put slightly differently, emanative causation in the neo-Platonic tradition, and in the DQE hypothesis, “flows” down the hierarchical chain from spiritual beings to, ultimately, matter; and so it would be highly unorthodox for Newton to have conceived spatial extension as the emanative effect of material being, especially given the deep disparity in Newton’s characterization of space and matter: “extension is eternal, infinite, uncreated, uniform throughout, not in the least mobile, nor capable of inducing changes of motion in bodies or change of thought in the mind; whereas body is opposite in every respect” (33). Indeed, this simple hierarchical relationship between God and body, mediated via God’s attribute of extension, is very likely the underlying motivation for Newton’s DQE hypothesis, since he constantly criticizes the opposition (i.e., Cartesians and Scholastics) for “ascribing to corporeal substance that which solely belongs to the divine” (31; see section 3.2)—and, once again, what the Cartesians and Scholastics have been erroneously ascribing to corporeal substance is extension. Therefore, the strong non-substantivalist’s contention that, for Newton, “space (in some sense) ‘results from’ the existence of anything” (Stein 2002, 268), is inconsistent with the details of the DQE hypothesis—apparently only God, or an incorporeal being akin to a world soul, can be the emanative cause of space.​[26]​ 
Leaving aside the issue of incorporeal being, any interpretation that would posit matter as the emanative origin of space is likewise unacceptable given the basic ontological relationship between body and space on the DQE hypothesis. Material bodies are, in effect, portions of space that have been allotted certain empirical properties, such as impenetrability or color, and thus body presupposes spatial extension—body cannot, therefore, be the emanative cause of space. Newton carefully highlights body’s dependence upon space in describing the DQE hypothesis: “extension takes the place of the substantial subject in which the form of the body [i.e., the determined quantities] is conserved by the divine will” (29). It would be quite odd, therefore, if Newton held that the determined quantities, as the “forms” or properties, were the ontological foundation of their own, as it were, “substantial subject”. 
We should return at this point to the topic of attributes and their dependence upon God. Throughout Newton’s analysis in the De Gravitatione, the dependence upon God of all possible substances, attributes, or accidents is constantly acknowledged, and this includes space, of course:
For certainly whatever cannot exist independently of God cannot be truly understood independently of the idea of God. God does not sustain his creatures any less than they sustain their accidents, so that created substance, whether you consider its degree of dependence or its degree of reality, is of an intermediate nature between God and accident. And hence the idea of it no less involves the concept of God, than the idea of accident involves the concept of created substance. And so it ought to embrace no other reality in itself than a derivative and incomplete reality. Thus the prejudice just mentioned must be laid aside, and substantial reality is to be ascribed to these kinds of attributes [i.e., extension], which are real and intelligible things in themselves and do not need to be inherent in a subject [i.e., an accident inherent in corporeal substance], rather than to the subject [i.e., corporeal substance] which we cannot conceive as dependent [upon God], much less form any idea of it. And this we can manage without difficulty if (besides the idea of body expounded above) we reflect that we can conceive of space existing without any subject when we think of a vacuum. And hence some substantial reality fits this. (32-33; emphasis added)

Since this passage clarifies to some degree the relationship between God and the attribute of extension, it is worth examining in closer detail. As described in section 3.2, Newton rejects the Cartesian and Scholastic accounts because they foster a conception of corporeal substance that appears to be independent of God (as well as incoherent). In its place, Newton champions a notion of extension as an affection or attribute of God, which naturally implies that the concept of extension, unlike corporeal substance, “cannot be truly understood independently of the idea of God”. In fact, having rejected corporeal substance, Newton argues that we should ascribe “some substantial reality” to extension as opposed to corporeal substance. That space can exist in the absence of body in Newton’s cosmology is also furnished as evidence against assigning extension to corporeal substance. One should not, accordingly, construe the term “subject” (subjecto) as referring to any subject, whether God or a lesser substance/being—rather, “subject” consistently refers to corporeal substance in these passages. It is only on this interpretation that Newton’s overall argument makes sense: it would not be consistent for Newton to criticize the Cartesians and Scholastics for positing a conception of corporeal substance that is independent of God, and then put forward his own preferred thesis that makes spatial extension independent of all “subjects”, taken broadly, and thus God! With respect to the pivotal sentence italicized in this quote, we can give a more accurate rendition as follows: “substantial reality is to be ascribed to the attribute of spatial extension, which is a real and intelligible thing-in-itself and does not need to be an accident inhering in corporeal substance, rather than ascribe substantial reality to corporeal substance, which we cannot conceive as dependent upon God, much less form any coherent idea of it.” Implicit in this statement, of course, is the idea that the substantial reality of the attribute space is dependent upon God, which is the basis for Newton’s preference of the DQE hypothesis.   
Newton’s DQE hypothesis is therefore quite clear in assigning to space a form of “substantial” reality, an admission that may help to elucidate Newton’s earlier claim that space “approaches more nearly to the nature of substance” (22). In the passage quoted directly above, space is declared to have “some substantial reality”, although, as an attribute of God, it is obviously neither a substance nor an accident (i.e., given his rejection of the substance/accident dichotomy regarding space). The non-substantivalist interpretation of Newton is, accordingly, quite correct in claiming that Newton’s absolute space is not a substance. Yet, given that space is emanative effect of a higher, incorporeal being, the substantial reality that Newton does bestow upon extension makes it practically equivalent—“approaches more nearly”—to the traditional substance concept: not only can space exist in the absence of all corporeal existents, but, on the DQE hypothesis, spatial extension replaces corporeal substance as the “container” of his mobile, determined bodily quantities (see, also, endnote 23). Therefore, despite a minor tactical victory in rejecting space as a substance, the more radical non-ontological and non-theological reading of Newton’s spatial theory championed by the strong non-substantivalists is simply not upheld under a close scrutiny of the relevant texts. 

4. Neo-Platonism and the Ontology of Space: More, Charleton, Newton. 
Notwithstanding the evidence presented in sections 2 and 3, the strong non-substantivalists would likely counter that the traditional ontological conception of Newton’s spatial theory cannot satisfactorily explain two of its important features (while the non-substantivalist interpretation can): first, why did Newton utilize affections/attributes in place of the more familiar accidents, as manifest in his well-known statement that “Space is an affection of a being just as a being” (2004, 25)?; and second, why is space associated with “being just as a being” (ens/entis quatenus ens)? In this section, a more detailed comparison of Newton, More, and Charleton, will help to shed light on these mysteries. As will be argued, the second question discloses a predominate feature of the spatial ontologies of late seventeenth century English natural philosophy, which Newton shares with both More and Charleton, whereas the first question is indicative of Newton’s general discontent with the substance/accident distinction, and in this manner marks a point of departure away from More’s ontology towards the line favored by Gassendi-Charleton. The rationale for focusing on the these two philosophers, More and Charleton, is that: first, their influence on Newton is well-documented; and second, they represent the two dominant positions in Newton’s time on the relevance of the substance/accident dichotomy for space (with Charleton sponsoring Gassendi’s popular solution; see section 2).​[27]​  
4.1. Extension and Accidents. If one seeks a rationale for Newton’s characterization of space as an attribute (or affection), a likely candidate is the potential metaphysical difficulties associated with classifying space as an accident. In More’s later, Enchiridion Metaphysicum (1671), space is an accident of God in the traditional substance/accident sense, although More uses the term “attribute”, and sometimes “affection”, instead of “accident”: 
The real attribute of some real subject can be found nowhere else except where in the same place there is some real subject under it. And, indeed, extension is the real attribute of a real subject . . . . Indeed, we cannot not conceive a certain immobile extension pervading everything to have existed from eternity . . . and really distinct, finally, from mobile matter. Therefore, it is necessary that some real subject be under this extension, since it is a real attribute. (More 1995, 56-57) 

More is thereby led to conclude that spatial extension must be the attribute of an incorporeal substance, and, while the details are not explicit, More seems to embrace the notion that attributes “inhere” in substances: “extension indeed is in the real subject” (1995, 68).​[28]​ In contrast, Walter Charleton’s popular Gassedian tract, although quite similar to More’s views in many ways, nevertheless parts company with More by declaring that space is neither substance nor accident, since it is “more general than those two” (Charleton 1654, 66), an opinion earlier adopted by Gassendi (Gassendi 1972, 384).​[29]​   
While rejecting More’s accident conception of space, Newton’s DQE thesis (from the De Gravitatione) does resemble More’s theory in that all extended things, whether body or spirit, necessitate the infinite spatial extension grounded in God’s existence. Throughout, Newton repeatedly claims that extension “does not exist as an accident inhering in some subject” (2004, 22), and this argument also surfaces much later (1719-1720) in a paragraph he intended for the Des Maizeaux edition of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence:
The Reader is desired to observe, that wherever in the following papers through unavoidable narrowness of language, infinite space or Immensity & endless duration or Eternity, are spoken of as Qualities or Properties of the substance which is Immense or Eternal, the terms Quality & Property are not taken in that sense wherein they are vulgarly, by the writers of Logick & Metaphysics applied to matter; but in such a sense as only implies them to be modes of existence in all beings, & unbounded modes & consequences of the existence of a substance which is really necessarily & substantially Omnipresent & Eternal; Which existence is neither a substance nor a quality, but the existence of a substance with all its attributes properties & qualities, . . . . (Koyré and Cohen 1962, 96-97)

In his correspondence with Leibniz, Clarke had suggested that space is a “property” of God (2000, 19, 30), and this may have prompted Newton, in the above passage, to qualify and correct Clarke’s terminology and overall argument. Since the term “property” is likely to be taken as synonymous with “accident”, Newton reminds the reader that space is not an accident, and thus space does not inhere in God in the way bodily accidents inhere in matter. 
Carriero notes that, “it is a standard theological position that there are no accidents in God” (1990, 123), yet, a more relevant problem with viewing spatial extension as God’s accident is that it encourages a crude geometric or spatial picture of the “inherence relationship” between an accident and its subject. As with mundane material objects, there is a tendency to conceive this relationship in such a manner that the subject, in this case, God, takes on the accident, extension, along with all of the consequences normally associated with extension, e.g., divisibility, location, three-dimensionality. Leibniz raises some of these worries in the correspondence with Clarke: “If infinite space is God’s immensity, . . . therefore we must say, that what is in space, is in God’s immensity, and consequently in his essence; . . . Strange expressions; which plainly show, that the author makes a wrong use of terms” (2000, 45). In the Enchiridion, More strives to circumvent this dilemma by ascribing to space some of the same incorporeal features that belong to God, for example, that God and space are both “simple”, i.e., indivisible, such that they lack physical parts (More 1995, 58). It is not surprising, therefore, that More ultimately concludes on the basis of these similarities (among God and space) that there are two types of extension, namely, the divisible extension of corporeal matter and the indivisible extension of incorporeal spirit (with infinite spatial extension being an attribute of the latter; 1995, 118: More additionally infers the existence of “physical monads”, which would constitute matter’s indivisible basic parts, 71-81).​[30]​ 
4.2. Nullibism and Holenmerism. More’s conclusion that all being is spatially extended is likewise supported by his rejection of two popular hypotheses on the relationship between God and space: first, he rejects the “nullibist” view favored by the Cartesians, among others, that God is nowhere in space; and, second, he rejects “holenmerism” (or “holenmerianism”), a belief common among the Scholastics, that God is whole in every part of space (which thereby guarantees that God is not divisible even if matter and space are divisible; More 1995, 98-148). Given the rejection of these two hypotheses, the seemingly inevitable outcome is that incorporeal spirit is extended, a conclusion also adopted by Newton’s Neo-Platonist contemporary, Joseph Raphson (see, Koyré 1957, chap. 8).
As with many of his spatial hypotheses, Newton’s anti-nullibist reasoning closely follows More’s. As first disclosed in section 2, Newton also reckons that both corporeal and incorporeal being are extended, as the much quoted passage from the De Gravitatione makes clear: after declaring that, “Space is an affection of a being just as a being”, he explains that, “No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist” (2004, 25). A bit further, he adds: “If ever space had not existed, God at that time would have been nowhere; and hence he either created space later (where he was not present himself), or else, which is no less repugnant to reason, he created his own ubiquity” (26). As for Gassendi and Charleton, both reject nullibism for the same reasons as More, and thus their natural philosophy may have also been a source for Newton’s anti-nullibism: e.g., “no substance can be conceived existent without Place and Time” (Charleton 1654, 66). On the other hand, Gassendi accepts holenmerism (“the divine substance is supremely indivisible and whole at any time and any place”; 1976, 94); as does (presumably) Charleton (1654, 70).
If Newton clearly articulates his anti-nullibist philosophy, his opinions on holenmerism are more difficult to discern. Indeed, the question as to the manner of God’s relation to extension may comprise the most complex and perplexing element in his spatial metaphysics. Overall, numerous passages in the De Gravitatione, as well as some later works, support a close analogy between the extension of material beings and God’s extension. He begins by explaining that “[space and time] are affections or attributes of a being according to which the quantity of any thing’s existence is individuated to the degree that the size of its presence and persistence is specified” (25). He then proceeds to compare the “quantity of existence” among God and created being: “So the quantity of the existence of God is . . . infinite in relation to the space in which he is present; and the quantity of the existence of a created thing . . . in relation to the size of its presence, it is as great as the space in which it is present” (25-26). This explanation suggests that God and created beings do not differ as regards extension, contra holenmerism, since the same, as it were, “metric”—dubbed, quantity of existence—applies equally to both, but with important exception that God has an infinite quantity of existence and created beings do not (or need not). Yet, “quantity of existence” is a fairly mysterious and undefined notion in the De Gravitatione, so it is difficult to draw a specific conclusion based on this use of terminology.
In the subsequent passage, however, a better case can be made that Newton does side with More’s anti-holenmerist strategy: “lest anyone should for this reason imagine God to be like a body, extended and made of divisible parts, it should be known that spaces themselves are not actually divisible . . .” (26). So, Newton not only fails to reject the claim that God is extended, but he also claims, along with More, that space is not really divisible. It would seem, therefore, that the Newton of the De Gravitatione, like More, may have regarded the indivisibility of space as a solution to the controversy concerning God’s potential divisibility (see, also, Janiak 2000, 224). Newton rounds out this discussion by drawing an interesting analogy between the “extension” of both God’s being and a temporal moment: “And just as we understand any moment of duration to be diffused (diffundi) throughout all spaces, according to its kind, without any concept of its parts, so it is no more contradictory that mind also, according to its kind, can be diffused through space without any concept of its parts” (26; emphasis added). That is, just as “a moment of duration is the same . . . throughout all the heavens” (26), Newton maintains that God—conceived neo-Platonically as a mind-like, spiritual being—is likewise the same, part-less being throughout all space.​[31]​ 
4.3. Ens Quatenus Ens. Having exposed the neo-Platonist undercurrent in the De Gravitatione’s rejection of nullibism and (perhaps) holenmerism, we are finally in a position to grasp the import of his various claims that space is an attribute/affection of “a being just as a being” (ens quatenus ens). The purpose of this sort of explanation, in brief, is not to offer a unique non-ontological proposal on the relationship between space and existents, i.e., that space is a logical or conceptual presupposition or fact associated with any existent, as the strong non-substantivalist suggests; rather, Newton’s intention, replicating More’s earlier maneuver, is to put forward an ontology that counters nullibism (that God is nowhere in space) and maybe even holenmerism (that God is in complete in every part of space). Or, to put it differently, Newton’s use of ens quatenus ens does not comprise a substitute for, or demotion of, traditional ontological hypothesizing about the nature of space: ens quatenus ens is, in fact, the end result of such ontological speculation. Metaphysical and theological worries associated with various notions of God’s relationship to extension, among other concerns, are the principle grounds for Newton’s concept that space belongs to “being just as a being”. In addition, Newton’s ens quatenus ens hypothesis may have relied heavily on similar discussions in More’s Enchiridion, where a metaphysics of “being just as a being” forms that backdrop of More’s thought, including his spatial hypotheses: e.g., “the essence of any being insofar as it is a being is constituted of amplitude [extension] and differentia [form], which distinguishes amplitude from amplitude” (1995, 9; emphasis added). Overall, the strategy of both More and Newton is to tie spatial extension, in some form at least, to all “being”, even God, rather than to just a sub-class of being (as, for example, in the Cartesian identification of extension with corporeal being). This solution is not unique to More and Newton, though, for all existents are likewise extended for Gassendi and Charleton.    
Returning to Newton’s famous quote, that “space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited” (2004, 25), Stein contends that “the second clause tells us precisely what the first clause means” (Stein 2002, 269). But, as argued in section 2, this explanation hinges on a questionable interpretation of a phrase that appears only once in the De Gravitatione, “first existing being”; and there were clear precedents in the earlier Cambridge neo-Platonist literature for employing “emanative effect” to signify a form of efficient causation (namely, More). Given the discussion above, we are now in a better position to grasp that the phrase, “for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited”, is not intended to explain the meaning of “emanative effect”, but is instead another instance of Newton’s ens quatenus ens thesis that space is an attribute/affection of “a being just as a being”. Stein’s error, in brief, is that he conflates the meaning and purpose of two distinct hypotheses, namely, emanative causation and ens quatenus ens. Evidence for the separation of these hypotheses is contained, moreover, in Newton’s first reference to emanation in the De Gravitatione, where he claims that “[space] is as it were an emanative effect of God and an affection of every kind of being” (21, emphasis added). What is revelatory about this passage is that it does not run together the construal of space as an “emanative effect of the first existing being” and space as “an affection of every being” (= “if any being is posited, space is posited”) in the manner advocated by Stein—rather, these two hypotheses are clearly distinguished in this quotation, thus raising an obstacle for Stein’s attempt to use the latter concept to explain the meaning of the former.
To better grasp the intent of Newton’s much-debated claim, it would be helpful to quote the broader context of the paragraph in full:
Space is an affection of a being just as a being. No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way. God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space that it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist. And hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited. And the same may be asserted of duration: for certainly both are affections or attributes of a being according to which the quantity of any thing’s existence is individuated to the degree that the size of its presence and persistence is specified. So the quantity of the existence of God is eternal in relation to duration, and infinite in relation to the space in which he is present; and the quantity of the existence of a created thing is as great in relation to duration as the duration since the beginning of its existence, and in relation to the size of its presence, it is as great as the space in which it is present. (25-26)

The first sentence begins with the exposition of the ens quatenus ens hypothesis, and Newton makes it clear, in the second sentence, that extension also pertains to God in some manner (“No being exists . . .”). The third sentence posits an omnipresent God in infinite space, “God is everywhere”, and adds that created minds and bodies are located in, and occupy, this same space (and cannot be nowhere)—i.e., minds are “somewhere”, and body “is in the space that it occupies”, but, of course, since God is “everywhere”, these lesser beings must also “partake” of God’s extension in some way (i.e., leaving aside the difficulties associated with holenmerism). This last point is presented quite explicitly a bit later in the paragraph: “the quantity of the existence of God is . . . infinite in relation to the space in which he is present” (emphasis added; see section 4.2). The fourth sentence is Stein’s favored quote (“space is an emanative effect . . .”), but it begins with the phrase, “And hence it follows that”, which is an important qualification since it relates the content that follows to the previous three sentences. In short, Newton is arguing that, since God is omnipresent, and since the other beings occupy finite portions of the infinite space brought about by God, “hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited”—or, more carefully, space must be the emanative effect of an unlimited, omnipresent being (“the first existing being”) because all being manifests extension in some fashion (“for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited” = ” Space is an affection of a being just as a being”), and thus the remaining (finite) beings require an omnipresent being to ground the existence of the infinite space in which they reside; likewise for time, as disclosed in the two remaining sentences of the paragraph. Here, it is important to recall our analysis (in section 2.2) of an identical line of reasoning in More’s Enchiridion, where an infinitely extended “first Being” also plays a pivotal foundational role for the extension of all other being: “That which, however, is the first Being and receives all others, without doubt exists by itself, since nothing is prior to that which sustains itself” (1995, 59; emphasis added). Consequently, the final clause, “for if any being whatsoever is posited, space is posited”, does not explain the meaning of “emanative effect”—on the contrary, the final clause, as an instance of the ens quatenus ens hypothesis, provides Newton with the justification for positing space as an emanative effect of an infinite (omnipresent) “first existing being”. And, of course, nowhere in Newton’s discussion is there even the slightest hint that any other being, other than God or a world soul, can serve the function of securing the existence of his conception of infinite space.​[32]​ Put differently, space is not a necessary consequence of the existence of any being, as Stein contends; rather, the entailment goes in the other direction: the actual existence of any being necessarily presupposes space, and only God can secure that precondition.
Finally, leaving aside the ontological basis for Newton’s coupling of space to ens quatenus ens, another problem with the strong non-substantivalist interpretation is that it leaves the impression that Newton is the sole originator of the ens quatenus ens thesis, when the accolades clearly belong to a host of prior natural philosophers, especially More. If one truly seeks those features in Newton’s theory that mark a new path forward from previous spatial ontologies, then it would not be Newton’s employment of the ens quatenus ens doctrine. The novel element in Newton’s spatial theory, given his anti-nullibism and (possible) holenmerism, is that he does not follow More in declaring that space is God’s accident; rather, Newton apparently sides with the position advocated by Gassendi and Charleton that space is neither accident nor substance. The real question posed by Newton’s spatial ontology, the non-substantivalist’s rhetoric notwithstanding, is why Newton parts company with More’s spatial theory on this point.
4.4. Newton’s Version of A Neo-Platonist Theory Space. Although a thorough discussion is beyond the bounds of this essay, there are a few interesting features in Newton’s handling of spatial concepts in the De Gravitatione that might indicate the basis for his divergence from More’s theory. Foremost among these differences is Newton’s reluctance to categorize spatial extension as “incorporeal”, a designation that both the Gassendi-Charleton approach and the Cambridge neo-Platonists all straightforwardly embrace (see endnote 30). The rationale for Newton’s omission likely derives from his general dissatisfaction with the concept of substance, and, in particular, the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substance. As first disclosed in section 3, Newton’s De Gravitatione rejects any sharp Cartesian separation of mental and material substance. He claims that “if extension is eminently contained in God, or the highest thinking being, certainly the idea of extension will be contained within the idea of thinking, and hence the [Cartesian’s complete] distinction between these ideas will not be such that both may fit the same created substance, that is, but that a body may think, and a thinking being be extended” (31). Turning to the Scholastic bare substance/substantial form dichotomy, Newton subsequently addresses the topic of attributes, and suggests that the dissolution of the corporeal/incorporeal divide among substances induces a similar blurring of the distinction among corporeal and incorporeal attributes:
If we adopt the common idea (or rather lack of it) of body, according to which there resides in bodies some unintelligible reality that they call substance, in which all the qualities of the bodies are inherent, this (apart from its unintelligibility) is exposed to the same problems as the Cartesian view. Since it cannot be understood, it is impossible that its distinction from the substance of the mind should be understood. For the distinction drawn from substantial form or the attributes of substance is not enough: if bare substances do not have an essential difference, the same substantial forms or attributes can fit both, and render them by turns, if not at one and the same time, mind and body. (31-32; emphasis added)

In short, if extension is an attribute of both mind and body, then the need for More’s or Charleton’s incorporeal classification of spatial extension is precluded. Space, at least in the De Gravitatione, is simply God’s attribute, an attribute that generically applies to all classifications of being, whether corporeal or incorporeal, since all being emanates from God.
Furthermore, although he reckons that God is more akin to a mind-like, incorporeal substance, this does not dissuade Newton from ultimately entertaining doubts about the viability of the substance concept itself. Indeed, Newton is so averse to the notion of substance that he considers the possibility that we can conceive of God’s attributes without a corresponding conception of God’s substance: “if we should have an idea of that attribute or power by which God, through the action of his will alone, can create beings, we should readily conceive of that attribute as subsisting by itself without any substantial subject and [thus as] involving the rest of his attributes” (33). Besides the “power to create beings”, one of God’s other attributes, needless to say, is spatial extension. Hence, Newton implies that we can conceive of extension, which is one of God’s attributes, without a corresponding notion of God’s substance. In the General Scholium to the 1713 edition of the Principia, one can detect an equal degree of ambiguity in Newton’s characterization of substance, alongside a more optimistic assessment of attributes: “there is no direct sense and there are no indirect reflected actions by which we know innermost substances; much less do we have an idea of the substance of God. We know him only by his properties and attributes . . . “ (Newton 2004, 91).
Consequently, given his refutation of the corporeal/incorporeal divide (as it pertains to both substance and accident), and given his deeply rooted suspicion of substance ontologies in general, it is not surprising that Newton’s De Gravitatione resorts to an alternative approach that eschews altogether the substance/accident dichotomy for extension. On the Gassendian philosophy, space is neither a substance nor an accident of substance, a conclusion that Newton apparently found more amenable to his unique neo-Platonic perspective that derided the very concept of substance. Yet, other components of the Gassendi-Charleton philosophy would have run counter to Newton’s outlook. For instance, Newton’s rejection of a corporeal/incorporeal distinction may also explain his apparent reluctance to embrace their holenmerism, since that view implies that immaterial extension differs from material extension, which tacitly reintroduces, once again, a material/immaterial dichotomy (see section 4.2). Rather, Newton may have followed More’s lead on this point, at least in the De Gravitatione, by linking spatial extension, which is simple and indivisible, to a simple, indivisible, extended God (see endnotes 30, 31). Additionally, Gassendi’s claim that space is merely a “negative quality” (Gassendi 1972, 389; see section 2.2) is difficult to reconcile with Newton’s emanationist ontology. Like More, Newton is similarly compelled to associate space with incorporeal existents, despite his reluctance to employ the incorporeal label: since space must be the affection of a being, there is only one being, God, that can secure the infinity, indivisibility, etc., of space. 
In contrast to his precursors, whose spatial theories strive to retain some vestige of an incorporeal/corporeal distinction (More, Charleton), as well as an accident/substance metaphysics for space (More), Newton’s own reflections on the ontology that he inherited from his predecessors may have thus led him to conclude in the De Gravitatione that these dichotomies were no longer tenable.​[33]​ It is in this “skeptical” sense, especially as regards substance, that Newton can be seen as advancing the debate on the ontology of space in a more modern, third-way direction, a point duly noted by Stein (2002, 281). But, as should be readily apparent by now, the basis for Newton’s forward-looking, skeptical treatment of substance is deeply rooted in his neo-Platonic metaphysics. Newton’s primary criticism of the Cartesians and Scholastics, as we have seen, stems largely from his belief that their idea of substance entails a troubling dualism of mind and body, as well as from a general worry “that atheists [may] arise ascribing to corporeal substance that which solely belongs to the divine” (32). In essence, it would appear to be specifically neo-Platonic concerns, related to the overlap of the Western conception of God and the mind/body problem, in particular, that prompt Newton’s unique ontology, and not any sort of novel, non-ontological insight into the nature of space overlooked by his illustrious predecessors.​[34]​

5. Conclusion.
In summary, there is not much that is shockingly original in Newton’s treatment of the venerable spatial themes surveyed in our investigation, and what is original can be seen as arising naturally from the work of his older contemporaries (as variations on their hypotheses). For instance, given his neo-Platonic leanings towards emanationism (with its primacy of the incorporeal, rejection of substance dualism, etc.), it was argued that Newton’s dismissal of a substance/accident ontology for space—a maneuver that already possessed a long pedigree by the late seventeenth century—fits naturally into a philosophy that is hostile to the very idea of substance. Hence, the grandiose claims made on Newton’s behalf by the strong non-substantivalists, in particular, the alleged non-ontological uniqueness of Newton’s theory when contrasted with his neo-Platonic predecessors, as argued in Stein (2002), cannot but fail to strike the historian of Early Modern spatial concepts as rather exaggerated. Why not heap the same praises on the nearly identical, and equally adventurous, ontologies put forward by, for instance, Charleton or More?
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^1	  Substantivalism is itself a complex subject, with various explanations spotlighting different aspects of the concept: e.g., Sklar (1974, 161), whose famous contribution focuses more on its status as an independently existing entity, whereas Earman (1989, 12-14) places greater emphasis on the role of spacetime points. A detailed exploration is beyond the bounds of this essay, but we will largely side with Sklar’s approach, mainly due to the fact that spatial points/parts are not the central issue as to the neo-Platonic basis of Newton’s spatial ontology. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, the possible independent existence of space per se (and not just its points/parts) is the key feature as regards neo-Platonism. Moreover, since a substantivalist, or any other theory of space approaching substantivalism, must address the question concerning how the spatial points/parts relate to the whole of space, this issue is not the best means of determining a commitment to substantivalism (since there is no clear precedent, as will be argued in the case of Newton). However, if forced to give a quick synopsis, then, following Sklar’s definition, Newton’s space is not substantivalist, since space necessarily depends on God; but it is substantivalist if “independence” only means “independent of matter”. The essay will also argue that, while strong non-substantivalism fails (since Newton’s space is deeply metaphysical and theological in orientation), weak substantivalism is nonetheless a consistent interpretation (although difficult to corroborate). See, also, endnotes 4, 8, 9.      
^2	  The ensuing analysis will attempt to demonstrate that Cambridge neo-Platonism and the (very similar) Gassendi-Charleton philosophy is the primary influence on Newton’s ontology of space. McGuire comments, furthermore, on “the question of [the Cambridge neo-Platonist] Henry More’s influence on Newton’s doctrine of extended space”, concluding “that it is minimal in the period from 1664 to 1668” (1983, 152; where the four year span, 1664-1668, covers the then accepted period for the composition of Newton’s major treatise on the ontology of space, the De Gravitatione—see endnote 17 on the recent dating of this work). In contrast, McGuire later concedes “that a possible influence” on Newton’s concept of emanation (see section 2) “is Henry More” (1990, 105); and, in his most recent work (2000, 2007), he successfully pursues a number of neo-Platonic threads in Newton’s natural philosophy. Nevertheless, these post-1990 reappraisals fall short of retracting McGuire’s earlier demotion of the Cambridge neo-Platonist influence, and thus the justified authority of McGuire’s pre-1990 work is likely to give a misleading impression of his evolving conception of these issues (if examined in isolation from the later output). In private discussion, McGuire has indeed confirmed this potential mischaracterization of his overall Newton scholarship, adding that the newer dating of the De Gravitatione provided a crucial stimulus to the evolution of his views. Finally, unless otherwise noted, all italics in citations are form the original, and all references to neo-Platonism refer to the seventeenth century varieties then popular in England.
^3	  That is, unlike the relationists (Descartes, Huygens, Leibniz, etc.), Newton understood that the motions and interactions of material bodies could not be adequately treated by recourse to their relative motions alone (e.g., the famous “bucket experiment” in the Principia; 1999, 408-415). Absolute spatial position and absolute velocity, however, would eventually be seen as overly rigid and unnecessary structures for an adequate treatment of acceleration within the context of Newtonian physics. As DiSalle comments, a four-dimensional spacetime structure equipped with an affine connection would have sufficed for Newton’s purposes (2002, 35).   
^4	  In reflecting on the question, “What concepts of time, space, and motion [in Newton’s Principia] are required by a dynamical theory of motion?”, DiSalle offers what is possibly his most forthright endorsement of the weak non-substantivalist line: “Asking this question about Newton’s theory does not deny its connection with his profound metaphysical convictions—not only about space and time, but about God and his relationship to the natural world. On the contrary, it illuminates the nature of those convictions and their relationship to Newton’s physics. For Newton, God and physical things alike were located in space and time. But space and time also formed a framework within which things act on one another, and their causal relations become intelligible through their spatio-temporal relations—above all, through their effects on each other’s state of motion.” (2002, 38; emphasis added). While acknowledging Newton’s “profound metaphysical convictions”, which include space, time, and “God and his relationship to the natural world”, DiSalle adds that space and time “also” formed a framework for understanding the causal relationships among bodies. The implication of this assessment, arguably, is that the content or role of space and time for Newton may not be exhausted by their constructive function in his physics. The fact that DiSalle does not seriously engage the details of Newton’s metaphysics in order to counter the traditional substantivalist line thus lends support for this “weak” reading—although he does come close at times: “Newton was not a ‘substantivalist’, at least not in the now-standard use of the term” (emphasis added), since Newton was critical of substance ontologies, and he did not regard the parts of space as possessing an intrinsic individuality, whereas the modern substantivalist (often) does view spacetime points as irreducibly basic existents (2006, 37; see, sections 3 and 4, and endnotes 1, 8, and 9, for related discussions). Once again, this appraisal leaves open the possibility that other notions of substance, “not in the now-standard use of the term”, might apply in Newton’s case. Incidentally, one of the first truly modern cases made for a weak non-substantivalist interpretation of Newton is Toulmin (???), although Stein’s landmark (1967, 277-282) is better known (but it also hints towards a strong non-substantivalist reading as well).
^5	  While a strict relationist confines space to the actual relations among existing objects, weaker forms of relationism define space as the actual and possible relations among existing objects. Yet, even on the these weaker forms, certain meaningful physical states-of-affairs would seem to be ruled out, such a lone rotating body in an otherwise empty universe (because there is nothing relative to which it could rotate). These considerations thus render even the weaker forms of relationism unacceptable for Newton’s spatial theory (unless the possible relations include a body’s relations to earlier states of itself). 
^6	  Throughout this essay, the term “non-ontological” as applied to Stein (2002) denotes a non-causal, non-being, and hence non-Platonic reading of Newton’s spatial theory; a reading that is motivated more by epistemology than metaphysics, since the causal, being, and Platonic aspects of Newton’s theory are systematically downgraded or rejected alltogether. 
^7	  Stein’s rejection of the traditional substantivalist and relationist ontologies is a leading theme throughout his work (e.g., 1967, 1977), although a thorough discussion is not relevant to our investigation. Further aspects of Stein’s interpretation are critically examined in Slowik (2007), including a more detailed investigation the substance/accident dichotomy in Newton, and the “third-way” notion of space.
^8	  Newton’s understanding of substance presumably draws from the wide variety of substance concepts prevalent in the seventeenth century. For instance, some portions of his concept reflect, say, the Cartesian line that it is an entity that can exist independently of all other beings (except God, of course), but other elements of his concept introduce more novel ideas, such as the ability to “act upon things”. Overall, Newton’s substance concept is difficult to accurately fix relative to his contemporaries and predecessors, largely because he seldom provides any details when employing this term. The same is true (in fact, more so) for his employment of “affection” and “attribute”, which seem to denote a property that is necessary for a being’s existence, whereas an “accident” (such as red, triangular, etc.) is not. Newton refers to space as an attribute/affection of all being, while denying that it is an accident, thus demonstrating (apparently) its necessity for all being (more on this below). See, once again, Bolton 1998, for these metaphysical categories, as well as Carriero 1990, for more on Newton’s use of “affection”.      
^9	  There are also hints of a third-way structuralist rendering of space in Stein’s analysis of Newton. In the De Gravitatione, it is claimed that the “parts of space are individuated by their positions, so that if any two could change their positions, they would change their individuality at the same time and each would be converted numerically into the other” (Newton 2004, 25; see, also, the Scholium on space in time in the Principia, which roughly makes the same argument, Newton 2004, 66). As regards this quotation, Stein reasons: “This can be taken, in rather modern terms, as saying that space is a structure, or “relational system”, which can be conceived of independently of anything else; its constituents are individuated just be their relations to one another, as elements of this relational system” (Stein 2002, 272). A “relational system [of the parts of space]”, as defined by Stein, is not to be confused with relationism, however. See, Slowik 2007, for more on this issue.
^10	  In a later writing, Newton does refer to infinite space and time as “modes of existence in all beings, & unbounded modes & consequences of the existence of a substance that which is really necessary & substantially Omnipresent & Eternal” (Koyré and Cohen 1962, 96-97; see, also, section 4.1). The use of the term “consequences”, in this passage, might be taken to support the non-ontological interpretation of Newton’s concept of space—yet, it is used in conjunction with the basic ontological term, “modes”, which denotes the specific way in which a being manifests a general property (e.g., “circular” is a mode of “shape”). Consequently, it is not clear whether this passage actually assists or harms the non-substantivalist cause.
^11	  This counter-argument is not conclusive, of course, since Newton may be merely relying on known ontological categories to describe a unique position. Stein, on the other hand, reads Newton’s quote (that space is closer to substance) as pertaining to the rejection of an accident ontology: “namely, in that [space] needs no ‘subject’ to ‘support’ its existence” (2002, 267). Presumably, “subject” and “support” are used here to signify an accident’s inherence (support) in a substance or being (subject), for, if these terms refer generally to any subject, then it would directly contradict Stein’s (later) claim that “space . . . ‘results from’ the existence of anything” (268; which necessitates a subject, of course). This thesis, that space “needs no ‘subject’ to ‘support’ its existence”, thereby complements his non-ontological reading of emanative effect. Yet, as will be demonstrated below, incorporeal spirit (God, or a world soul) is the “subject” required for Newton’s space.
^12	  The term “emanative effect” only appears three times in the De Gravitatione. Besides Stein’s favorite of these three quotations (i.e., “space is an emanative effect of the first existing being, . . .”), there are: “[space] is as it were an emanative effect of God and an affection of every kind of being” (21); and, “space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is the emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being” (26). 
^13	  In his depiction of the traits of infinite extension, More adds that “it is necessary that it be immobile. Which is celebrated as the most excellent attribute of First Being in Aristotle” (1995, 58). In the Metaphysics (Bk. XII, 1071b1-1071b10), Aristotle concludes that “it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible” (Aristotle 1984, 1692-1693). In short, the intended meaning of Newton’s “first existing being” almost certainly follows More’s usage, which, in turn, is based on Aristotle’s reasoning. More importantly, as the subsequent investigation of the De Gravitatione will demonstrate, Newton likewise demands an infinite, immobile “first existing being” to ground the existence and extension of lesser, mobile entities.   
^14	  McGuire (2007), following (1990, 105), likewise connects his earlier “ontic dependence” hypothesis with efficient causation: “It seems evident that emanative causation, as Newton understands it, reflects this relationship between God’s necessary existence and space’s uncreated nature: space exists always because God exists necessarily. Moreover, since the notion of an eternal and efficient cause does not necessarily involve activity, production, creation, or active efficacy between it and its effect, the distinction between ontic and causal dependence essentially collapses” (123-124).   
^15	  One of the main point of contention is how space relates to the divine essence. While various aspects of these traditionally theological issues will be discussed below, an in-depth examination is beyond the scope of this essay. Both commentators agree, however, that More likely, or possibly, influenced Newton’s quite similar hypothesis (McGuire 1990, 105; Carriero 1990, 112-115; see, also, endnote 2).
^16	  While providing a brief synopsis of the natural philosophy of the Cambridge neo-Platonists is difficult, the central feature is probably the rejection of a purely “mechanical” account of the material world (i.e., that all material phenomena can be completely explained through the interactions and impact of “inert” matter in motion). Rather, the neo-Platonists appealed to God, or spirit, as an active agent, or foundational basis, for all natural phenomena. See, e.g., Garber et al. (1998). As mentioned above, the details of Charleton’s Gassendian natural philosophy, which also adopts an incorporeal basis for space, are strickingly similar to Cambridge neo-Platonism in many respects, although there are important differences (e.g., the former’s repudiation of a substance-accident metaphysics for space).         
^17	  More is less forthcoming on the “uncreated” status of space in his earlier The Immortality of the Soul, although it is strongly implied in his discussion of emanative causation: “By an Emanative Cause is understood such a Cause as merely by Being, no other activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect” (1997b, 32). Newton’s list of the characteristic of space versus matter, in the De Gravitatione, thus may reveal a knowledge of More’s later Enchiridion, first published in 1671, as do many of the other features detailed in our investigation (namely, the “being as being” hypothesis, see section 4 below). The arguments for a later dating of the De Gravitatione (in Dobbs 1991, 130-146), i.e., after 1680, thereby gains support, since Newton’s treatise exhibits signs of several of More’s major works, including the Enchiridion. McGuire (1978a, 41, n. 27) had earlier remained a bit circumspect about the influence of More’s Enchiridion based on the earlier date supplied by Hall and Hall for the De Gravitatione (Newton 1962, 90), i.e., circa 1666; but McGuire has since advocated the later date (2007, 112). See, also, endnote 2.   
^18	  Another instance of the use of emanation that parallels Newton’s, although with respect to time, is employed by J. B. van Helmont, a natural philosopher in the early half of the seventeenth century who Newton had studied. See, Ducheyne (2008). 
^19	  The best overall treatment of these issues still remains Grant 1981. Translations of Patrizi’s spatial hypotheses are provided in Brickman 1943. For Gassendi’s philosophy of space, see his Syntagma philosophicum (published posthumously in his Opera Omnia, 1658), parts of which are translated in Brush 1972, and Capek 1976. Gassendi’s ideas form the main content of Charleton’s, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana (1654), a work known to Newton (see endnote 27). In the Physiologia, Charleton comments on the possible charge of impiety that can be leveled at a theory, like his, that makes space independent of God (68-69).
^20	  Incidentally, this version of the strong non-substantivalist position still differs from the weak variety (explained in section 1), since it continues to maintain that Newton’s actual ontology of space is non-substantivalist. The weak version, in contrast, only claims that Newton’s handling of his definitions and concepts related to Absolute space, etc., do not obligate substantivalism (or relationism), and thus Newton’s approach points forward to a third-way conception of space that eschews the standard ontological dichotomy. 
^21	  A similar interpretation of Stein (2002) has been put forward by Andrew Janiak: “Stein (forthcoming) . . . notes . . . that Newton’s view is not first and foremost a theological one, for its first premise is that space is an affection of all entities. The fact that God’s infinite and eternal existence makes it the case that space is infinite an eternal is logically parasitic on this first premise. That is, given the logical structure of Newton’s view, space would emanate from the first existent, whatever that first existent happened to be, because for Newton once we posit an entity we posit space. This just means that spatiality is what we might call—following Galileo’s discussion of the primary qualities of objects—a necessary accompaniment of the existence of entities” (Janiak 2000, 222, fn.67). As will be explained, there is abundant evidence to support the idea that space is a “necessary accompaniment” of the existence of any being for Newton—yet, this view was practically standard among Newton’s predecessors and contemporaries (for More, Charleton, Raphson, etc., also accepted it: see section 4). However, the claim, “space would emanate from the first existent, whatever that first existent happened to be”, cannot be supported: Newton’s use of emanation in the De Gravitatione, as well as its likely source in More, link emanation to higher incorporeal/spiritual beings alone (see section 3 and 4 below), and thus Newton’s theology does indeed play a fundamental role in Newton’s spatial theory. As with Stein, the above quote tends to run together “being as being” and emanative causation (see section 4.3), which are two distinct hypotheses.      
^22	  The phrase in brackets, “in some circumstances”, is excluded from Stein’s translation. The differences are not relevant to the above arguments against his overall position, however, so it will not be discussed.  
^23	  Newton’s DQE hypothesis in the De Gravitatione, alongside his denial of a corporeal/incorporeal dichotomy for substances and accidents/attributes, has Spinoza-like implications—at least in the sense that Newton’s theory would seem to posit only one being/substance, God, such that lesser beings/substances are contained in, or are a part of, God. And, indeed, Newton makes this very claim in an unpublished tract from the 1690s: “The most perfect idea of God is that he be one substance, simple, indivisible, live and making live, necessarily existing everywhere and always, understanding everything to the utmost, freely willing good things, by his will effecting all possible things, and containing all other substances in Him as their underlying principle and place; a substance which by his own presence discerns and rules all things, just as the cognitive part of a man perceives the forms of things brought into his brain, and thereby governs his own body; . . .” (McGuire 1978b, 123; emphasis added). On a similar theme, Sklar’s (1974) analysis of geometrodynamic theories of spacetime prompted this definition of “supersubstantivalism”: “not only does spacetime have reality and real structural features, but in addition, the material objects of the world, its totality of ordinary and extraordinary material things, are seen as particular structured pieces of spacetime itself” (1974, 221). Needless to say, Newton’s DQE hypothesis comes very close to supersubstantivalism, although the term “spacetime” in this quote would need to be substituted with the phrase “God’s spatial extension”. See, also, McGuire 2000 for a comparison with Plato’s Timaeus. 
^24	  The distinction between eminent containment and emanative causation is somewhat vague in the literature, but, presumably they are distinct hypotheses, and perhaps can stand alone in a given ontology. For example, one can hold that God eminently contains the reality manifest in, say, a stone, but that God’s creation of a stone does not employ the emanationist model favored by many neo-Platonists, who often marshal an assortment of “light” metaphors to describe the causal process whereby the higher-level entity (the light source) brings about the existence of lower-level entities (the light itself, or the shadow): e.g., lower-level beings are an “image” of, or a “radiation” from, a higher-level being, which is a type of explanation frequent in More’s oeuvre (e.g., 1995, 135). Now, in the above citation, it is possible that Newton may be simply contending that the Cartesian dualism of mind and body undermines Descartes’ previous sanction of eminent containment. Newton claims that Cartesian dualism entails that “God does not eminently contain extension within himself and therefore cannot create it”—but, as disclosed in section 2.2, Newton rejects the belief that extension is created, thus (leaving aside a mere lapse in terminology) the reference to eminent containment in this passage need not imply that Newton actually accepts this thesis. On the other hand, a bit earlier in the De Gravitatione, Newton remarks that “created minds (since it is the image of God) is of a far more noble nature than body, so that perhaps it may eminently contain [body] in itself” (30)—and, importantly, the context strongly favors the view that Newton is elaborating his own view here. Consequently, Newton may accept some form of the eminent containment thesis. However, Newton’s statements employing just “emanative effect” (see endnote 12) and “emanate” (see section 3.3) are alone sufficient to demonstrate his Cambridge neo-Platonist stance (and thus uphold the argument of this essay), regardless of the eminent containment issue. On the vexed issue of eminent containment in Descartes, see, Gorham 2003, and for, a contrasting picture, De Rosa 2007. 
^25	  In her collection of More extracts, MacKinnon summarizes the emanation concept as follows: “The universe of Neo-Platonism is formed by emanation from the One, through the descending stages of intelligence, the soul, and the world, with formless matter, or unreality, as the ultimate limit of the emanative power” (More 1925, 315).
^26	  McGuire (1978a, 15) explores a hypothetical interpretation that would allow beings other than God to ground the existence of space; yet, as disclosed in personal discussion, McGuire’s purpose was only to explore the implications of an emanationist ontology, and not to put forward the view that Newton actually accepted this hypothetical scenario. Unlike Stein, McGuire has always accepted that Newton’s theology is central to understanding his theory of space (see, e.g., 1978a, 38-39).  
^27	  See, Westfall 1962, and McGuire 1978a, on the references within Newton’s work to More and Charleton. Newton’s early notebook, Quaestiones quaedum Philosophicae (1661-1665, Cambridge University Library, Ms Add. 3996, folios 88-135), contains evidence that he had read, at the least, both Charleton’s Physiologia, as well as More’s, The Immortality of the Soul.  
^28	  More tends to complicate his hypothesis that space is God’s attribute by often referring to space as an incorporeal substance; e.g., in the ensuing section of the Enchiridion, he reasons that his theory utilizes “the very same way of demonstration which Descartes applies to proving space to be a substance, although it be false in that he would conclude it to be corporeal” (More 1995, 57). More rejects Descartes’ theory of space for many of the very same reasons that Newton provides in the De Gravitatione (and other works); for instance, that Descartes’ theory cannot account for possibility of a vacuum (which is conceivable). An early formulation of this argument appears in An Antidote against Atheism (1655): “If after the removal of corporeal matter out of the world, there will be still Space and distance, in which this very matter, while it was there, was also conceived to lye, and this distant Space cannot but be something, and yet not corporeal, because neither impenetrable nor tangible, it must of necessity be a substance Incorporeal, necessarily and eternally existent . . .” (More 1997, 338). More’s penchant for conflating “space as God’s attribute” and “space as identical to God’s substance” stands out clearly in this last quote, and it may have prompted Newton’s more careful attempts to deny the latter (see below).
^29	  Besides Newton’s contemporary, Joseph Raphson (see, Koyré 1957, chap. 8), another Cambridge neo-Platonist who held that space is an attribute/accident of God is Ralph Cudworth (see, Grant 1981, 230). However, the Patrizi-Gassendi solution, that space is neither accident nor substance, was quite popular in England: besides Charleton and Barrow, one should add the earlier neo-Platonic philosophies of Warner and Hill (see, Garber et al. 1998, 558-561). For additional assessments of More’s spatial theory, see, Boylan 1980, Copenhaver 1980, and, for the theological aspects of Newton’s theory, Snobelen 2001. Palter (1987, 395-398) argues that More did not influence greatly Newton’s criticisms of Cartesian motion (in the De Gravitatione): this is highly debatable, since criticism of Descartes’ theory of space, time, and motion were a constant theme throughout More’s opus, and thus he likely inspired the more potent series of counterarguments that begin Newton’s De Gravitatione (albeit Newton’s counterarguments are indeed more developed and unique in numerous ways). However, More’s influence on Newton’s spirit-based ontology of space is a separate issue from More’s influence on his critique of Cartesian motion.
^30	  More claims that space is “indiscerpible”, which means it can be divided in thought, but not physically (by removing or tearing), and this explains why it is “simple” (1995, 123-124). In addition, both More and Charleton believe that space is incorporeal, and this belief is based largely on the idea that the dimensions of space, like spirit, “penetrate” the dimensions of corporeal substance (More 1995, 123-124; Charleton 1654, 68). Newton’s DQE hypothesis nicely captures this aspect of their philosophy, since bodies are just parts of space endowed with material properties—consequently, Newton’s reference to the extension (diffusion) of “mind” throughout infinite space (see section 4.2) also follows these earlier philosophies by closely associating space with a spiritual entity. Yet, while both More and Charleton incorporate two types of extension, i.e., an incorporeal extension that penetrates corporeal extension, Newton’s DQE hypothesis is more parsimonious in that it employs only one, namely, the divine attribute of extension. Indeed, Newton never (to the best of our knowledge) refers to space as “incorporeal” (or “immaterial”, etc.), a quite significant fact that is noted by McGuire as well (1978a, 42, n.38).        
^31	  A similar claim is made in an unpublished manuscript from the 1690s (see, also, endnote 23): “[S]pace itself has no parts which can be separated from one another, . . . . For it is a single being [!], most simple, and most perfect in its kind” (McGuire 1978b, 117). Newton’s characterization of space as “simple”—i.e., space is not actually divisible into parts, although it may be conceptually divisible—thus matches More’s identical description of both space and God (see sections 2.1, 4.1, endnote 30), as well as Newton’s own description of God as “simple” (see endnote 23). Although McGuire has concurred (in private discussion) with the conclusions of this essay, he nonetheless defends something like a holenmerist option, citing an important passage in the General Scholium (1713), that apparently retracts the De Gravitatione’s claim that space is simple: “There are parts that are successive in duration and coexistent in space, but neither of these exist in the person of a man or in his thinking principle, and much less in the thinking substance of God” (2004, 91). This passage may indicate that Newton did indeed change his opinion on holenmerism. But, given the evidence advanced above, I would argue that, at the time the De Gravitatione (and at least through the early 1690s), Newton favored More’s anti-holenmerism: i.e., besides the claim that space is “simple”, Newton repeatedly strives to undermine the difference between immaterial and material extension (see, also, section 4.4, and endnotes 30, 33)—yet, holenmerism supports, or relies upon, this very distinction. Nevertheless, whether God’s extension is merely indivisible, as More held, rather than “whole in each part”, like Gassendi-Charleton, does not undercut the argument of this essay, since God’s existence is required for the existence of space on either option, contra strong non-substantivalism. 
^32	  Although it is beyond the scope of this essay, the infinity of space is presented as akin to an a priori certainty in the De Gravitatione, since, as McGuire also concludes, “in Newton’s view the presence of matter presupposes ontologically the infinitude of spatial extension” (1983, 184). Newton claims: “Space is extended infinitely in all directions. For we cannot imagine any limit anywhere without at the same time imagining that there is space beyond it” (2004, 23); and, “God at least understands that there are no limits, not merely indefinitely but certainly and positively, and because although we negatively imagine [extension] to transcend all limits, yet we positively and most certainly understand that it does so” (24-25, emphasis added). These declarations should lay to rest the possibility of devising a last-ditch, hypothetical variant of the strong substantivalist position; namely, that Newton could allow a finite being to “emanate” a finite space (on Stein’s reading of “emanative effect”). An infinitely extended material body is likewise incapable of “emanating” infinite space given Newton’s divergent estimates of the traits of both body and space (see section 3.4), as is evident in Newton’s final use of “emanative effect”: “space is eternal in duration and immutable in nature because it is the emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being” (26). In addition, in an unpublished text from the 1690s, Newton argues against the possibility “that a dwarf-god should fill only a tiny part of infinite space with this visible world created by him” (1978b, 123). Since God is the foundation for space (as so often stated in the De Grav and elsewhere), and given that the immutable nature of space must come from a similarly immutable being (God, as quoted above, 26), this passage strongly suggests that only an infinite being can ground the existence of infinite space (i.e., not a finite, dwarf God). Thus, this passage would contradict any reading that claims that a finite being can bring about infinite space. See, Slowik 2007, for a more elaborate examination of these issues.  
^33	  It unclear to what degree Newton’s rejection of an immaterial/material distinction, as evident in the De Gravitatione, extends to his later published works. In Query 29 to The Opticks, Newton does describe God as “a being incorporeal” (Newton 2004, 130), and, in the correspondence with Leibniz, Clarke likewise deems God an “incorporeal substance” (2000, 30). Yet, in the General Scholium of the 1713 Principia, Newton once again expresses skepticism regarding the concept of substance (see section 4.4); and, as observed in endnote 30, Newton never refers to space as immaterial. However, the General Scholium also includes a passage that may favor holenmerism (see endnote 31) and thus favor a material/immaterial distinction as regards space.
^34	  Before concluding, one final counter-argument needs to be addressed: Does the preceding analysis hinge exclusively on the evidence contained in the De Gravitatione, and thereby reflect only one, possibly non-representative, document among Newton’s oeuvre? The answer is a resounding “no”, since, as presented above, Newton continued throughout his remaining years to debate and develop the metaphysical ideas contained in the De Gravitatione. With the exception of the first edition of the Principia, which as noted in section 1, contains almost no mention of “God” and other metaphysical notions (but see endnote 9 on the parts of space), the ensuing years brought about a host of works that rehash the metaphysical and theological themes on space manifest in the De Gravitatione: General Scholium to the second edition of the Principia (section 4.2, 4.4, endnote 31, 33), 1690s manuscript, “Tempus et Locus” (endnote 23, 31, 32), Queries to The Opticks (section 3.2, endnote 33), conversations with Coste and Gregory (section 3.4), Des Maizeaux draft, and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (section 4.2, endnote 33). Indeed, as Peter Machamer has suggested (in private communication), Newton’s continuing preoccupation with the metaphysics of space, culminating in published references to these ideas in the Queries to The Opticks and the later editions of the Principia (let alone the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence), strongly suggests that the hypotheses contained in the De Gravitatione were of continuing importance to Newton throughout his remaining years.   
^35	  Space “is not one of those things that can be created” (Gassendi 1972, 390); “Space must be unproduced by, and independent upon the original of all Things, God” (Charleton 1654, 68).
^36	  For many helpful conversations, I would like to thank Alan Gabbey, Dan Garber, Peter Machamer, Andrew Janiak, Ted Richards, Eric Schliesser, and especially, Ted McGuire and Geoff Gorham. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Mid-Atlantic Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, Princeton University, April 1, 2007; and I would like to thank members of the audience and the program committee for their comments and assistance: in addition to those listed above, Sean Greenberg, Raffaella De Rosa, Martha Bolton, Andrew Chignell, Steve Bayne, and Laura Keating.   
